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INTRODUCTION

HE National Football League (NFL), which began operating in 1920,
is an unincorporated association, or league, of thirty professional
football clubs.' The NFL performs various functions, including
scheduling and organizing the pattern of games played between the member
teams. Like other businesses, one of the primary goals of the NFL is profit.
Unlike other businesses, however, the success of professional football depends on cooperative competition. While the teams attempt to defeat each
other on the field, they cooperate to achieve the optimum entertainment
package off the field.
To accomplish its goals, the NFL has instituted certain rules governing,
among other things, the terms and conditions of employment. These rules
are set forth in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, which expressly govern
the conduct of the NFL and its member clubs and implicitly govern the
conduct of the players. 2 The Constitution and Bylaws are applied to the
players through the NFL Player Contract. 3 Each NFL player must sign this
contract, which requires him to adhere to the NFL Constitution and
4
Bylaws.
The most litigated of the rules governing the terms and conditions of
player employment has been the restrictions on free agency. The NFL has
repeatedly sought to restrict player movement to ensure the best competitive
1. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 893 n.26 (D. Minn. 1992).
2. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (D. Minn. 1975), af'd, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
3. The Standard Players Contract was a standardized contract used by the NFL from
the early 1950s to 1976. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 779 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930
F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991) [hereinafter Powell I]. See generally JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 196-305 (1979 and 1985

Supplement) (for a discussion of the Standard Player Contract and related issues). From 1977
to present, the NFL has used a contract known as the NFL Player Contract, which is uniform
in all respects except for duration and compensation. Id. See generally GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW 350-56 (1986) (for the text of the NFL Player Contract). Although
the primary target of the antitrust battle has been the free agency restrictions, the NFL Player
Contract has also been attacked as the conduit through which the restrictions are applied to
the players. Id.; Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1005. In order to play football, a player is required
to accept the terms of the NFL Player Contract. Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1005 (citing NFL
CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 15.6).
4. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613.

1994]

1919

NFL FREE AGENCY

balance among the teams. The players, on the other hand, have repeatedly
sought unrestricted free agency. Every professional football player has a
vested interest in his freedom of choice - choice about the team with which
to play and the length of the stay. Because freedom of choice and movement
is a basic principle of the American job market, it would be untenable to
consider such restrictions on our own careers. Covenants not to compete
represent the most analogous restriction to the player restraints at issue, and
even those are limited in duration, geographical area, and scope.
Because the NFL and its owners will always seek to restrict the players in
some form and because the players will seek unrestricted movement, free
agency will always be an issue. This comment discusses the evolution, or
revolution as it may be, of free agency and its future. Since all of the claims
against the NFL concerning free agency are based on the federal antitrust
laws, Part II sets forth the basic antitrust principles applicable to professional sports, and more specifically, to the NFL. Part III discusses the history of player restraints and the cases affecting them, as well as the effects of
those cases on the general antitrust principles set forth in Part II. Part IV
discusses the recent case of McNeil v. NFL and its effects on player restraints. Part V introduces the 1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement (1993
Agreement) and the relevant provisions concerning free agency. Finally,
Part VI concludes with an analysis of the legal standards and principles that
will govern any future disputes which may arise after the expiration of the
1993 Agreement.
II.

ANTITRUST LAW APPLICABLE TO THE NFL

The Sherman Antitrust Act 5 was passed in 1890 to regulate the abuses in
commercial activity that arose amid the Industrial Revolution. 6 The primary purpose of antitrust law was, and still is, to promote competition. 7 In
this regard, section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract, combination .... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States ...

is declared to be illegal."

Applying the antitrust laws in

the context of professional sports presents unique problems. Unlike most
businesses, which seek to eliminate competition, "the cooperation of teams
off the playing field is necessary to effective and meaningful competition on
the playing field." 9 Certain anticompetitive activities are therefore necessary
to the success and existence of professional sports. The benefit of these activities must, however, be weighed against their anticompetitive effect to insure
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 23 (1976).
7. U.S. v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (holding that the purpose of the Sherman
Act is "in a word to preserve the right of freedom to trade"); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) ("The Sherman Act is designed to
promote national interest in a competitive economy .... ") (quoting American Safety Equip.
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968)).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).

9.

WILLIAM R. ANDERSON AND C. PAUL ROGERS

PRACTICE 910 (2d ed. 1992).

III,

ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND
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that the underlying policies of the antitrust laws are respected. The Supreme
Court specifically held that professional football is by no means immune
from the antitrust laws. 10 In every other professional sport, the Supreme
Court weighed the benefits and harms of the challenged restraint, and for
almost every such sport, has applied the antitrust laws to invalidate the anticompetitive conduct. I
In 1914 Congress enacted the Clayton Act 12 to supplement the antitrust
legislation embodied in the Sherman Act.13 Although the Clayton Act primarily regulates price discrimination and price fixing arrangements,1 4 several of its sections have been construed as exempting from the antitrust laws
certain potentially anticompetitive activities conducted by labor unions. 15
Two general types of exemptions exist in the antitrust laws: the statutory
labor exemption, a statutory exemption derived from specific provisions of
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, and the nonstatutory labor exemption, a judicially created exemption established to further federal labor policies left unprotected by the. statutory exemption. Where an exemption
applies, the conduct is beyond the reach of the antitrust laws.
A.

EXEMPTIONS

1. Statutory Labor Exemption
As an unintended result of applying the antitrust laws, the development of
unions was impeded. 16 To further federal labor policy, Congress created 1 a7
statutory exemption from the antitrust laws for unilateral union activities.
The statutory exemption insulates certain legitimate, although anti-competitive, union activities from the antitrust laws.18 Summarizing the scope of the
statutory labor exemption, the court in Bridgeman v. NBA 19 stated:
10. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (holding that the exemption from the
antitrust laws enjoyed by professional baseball did not extend to professional football and that
the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action under the Sherman Act).
11. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Haywood v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (professional basketball); United States v. International Boxing
Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (professional boxing). But see Federal Baseball Club
of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)
(holding that organized baseball is not subject to the antitrust laws because it is not involved in
interstate commerce). Although the Supreme Court subsequently held that professional baseball is engaged in interstate commerce, the Court's strict adherence to its previous decision,
based on the doctrine of stare decisis, has made attempts to overturn baseball's antitrust "exemption" unsuccessful. See ANDERSON & ROGERS, supra note 9, at 910 (citing Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) and Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953)).
12. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988 &

Supp. IV 1992)).
13. CHARLES W. DUNN, M.A., THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAW 18 (1930).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988); see also DUNN, supra note 13, at 19.
15. See Bridgeman v. National Basketball Assoc., 675 F. Supp. 960, 963-64 (D.N.J. 1987);

Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
16. Ethan Lock, Powell v. National Football League: The Eighth Circuit Sacks the National FootballLeague PlayersAssociation, 67 DENy. U. L. REV. 135, 139 (1990).
17. Phillip J. Clossius, Exemption and Immunities, in GOVERNMENT AND SPORT 140,
142 (Arthur T. Johnson & James H. Frey eds., 1985).
18. Powell , 678 F. Supp. at 782.
19. 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987).
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The concept of a labor exemption finds its source in sections 6 and 20
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. section 17 and 29 U.S.C. section 52, and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. sections 104, 105 and 113. Those
provisions declare that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade and specifically exempt certain union activities
such as secondary picketing and group boycotts from the coverage of
the antitrust laws. This statutory exemption insulated inherently anticompetitive collective activities by employees because they are favored
by federal labor policy.
The statutory exemption extends to legitimate labor activities unilaterally undertaken by a union in furtherance of its own interests. It does
not extend to concerted action or agreements between unions and non20
labor groups.
As noted by the court in Bridgeman, the application of the statutory exemption extends only to unilateral union activities, and not to the collective
bargaining between a union and the employer. 21 Because the exemption protects a union only so long as it acts unilaterally, the union is subject to antitrust liability once management agrees to implement the union's demands. 22
To fill this gap between unilateral union activity and legitimate collective
bargaining, the Supreme Court created the nonstatutory labor exemption. 23
2. Nonstatutory Exemption
The Supreme Court has "recognized that in order to properly accommodate the congressional policy favoring free competition ...with the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining . . . certain union-employer

agreements must be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions. ''2 4 While the statutory and nonstatutory exemptions provide similar protection from the antitrust laws, they differ in several
important aspects. First, because the nonstatutory exemption is a judicially
established doctrine, it does not afford the same absolute immunity as its
statutory counterpart.2 5 Immunity arises only where the "relevant federal
20. Id. at 963-64. Section 6 provides that "[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws shall
be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor ... organizations ... ; nor shall
such organizations . . . be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
Section 20 precludes courts from exercising their injunctive power in any labor dispute "unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right .... for which
injury there is no adequate remedy at law." 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1988). Section 20 then enumerates certain union activities that are absolutely protected from a restraining order or injunction

by the courts. Id.
21. See WILLIAM C.

HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 531 (1993); ANDERSON &

ROGERS, supra note 9, at 900-01.
22. ANDERSON & ROGERS, supra note 9, at 900.

23. Id.
24. Powell 1,678 F. Supp. at 782; see also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621 (1975) (the nonstatutory exemption has as its source the strong
labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and
working conditions); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965)
("[The e]xemption for uoion-employer agreements is very much a matter of accommodating
the coverage of the Sherman Act to the policy of the labor laws.").
25. See Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that
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labor policy is deserving of pre-eminence over federal antitrust policy under
the circumstances of the particular case."'26 This determination requires the
court to weigh the competing policies of antitrust and labor law. 27
Second, in addition to protecting the union's activity, the nonstatutory
labor exemption also protects management from antitrust scrutiny. 28 This
result arguably conflicts with the original purpose of the nonstatutory labor
exemption-to protect unions and their activities from antitrust scrutiny. 29
As a result of insulating unions, however, the nonstatutory exemption provides management derivative protection from the antitrust laws. 30
Finally, the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption is not clearly defined. 31 No general standard exists for applying the exemption to unionmanagement agreements. More importantly, in the context of professional
sports, the Supreme Court has yet to address whether the nonstatutory labor
exemption continues to apply in an expired agreement and, if applicable,
32
when the protection of the exemption terminates.

B.

METHODS OF ANALYSIS

The express language of section 1, that "every contract, combination ....
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" is illegal, would, if read literally, render
34
every business agreement illegal. 3 3 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States
the Supreme Court held, however, that the "standard of reason . ..was
intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether...
a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the
statute provided." '35 In this respect, the Supreme Court has stated: "A conclusion that a restraint of trade is unreasonable may be based either (1) on
the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances
giving rise to the inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices." 36 The Supreme Court has delineated two
methods of analysis that may be used to determine whether a particular act
"[m]andatory subjects of collective bargaining do not carry talismanic immunity from the antitrust laws").
26. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613; see also, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen
of N. Am. v. Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1979).
27. Clossius, supra note 17, at 142.
28. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 612.
29. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 700-13; Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW,
325 U.S. 797, 801-08 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229-37 (1941).
30. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 3, at 527.
31. Id. at 525.
32. Powell v. NFL, 498 U.S. 1040, 1040 (1991) (In denying certiorari, the Supreme Court
refused to consider the issue of the termination of the nonstatutory labor exemption.).
33. See Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
34. 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
342-43 (1982); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88
(1978); Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
35. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.
36. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (quoting National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 690).
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constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1: the
per se rule and the Rule of Reason.
1. The Per Se Rule
As courts gain experience with conduct subject to the antitrust laws, certain activities are identified "as being so consistently unreasonable that they
may be deemed to be illegal per se, without inquiry into their purported
justification." ' 37 The per se rule is, however, "limited to certain categories of
agreements that are so plainly anticompetitive and lacking in redeeming virtue that they are conclusively presumed to be illegal without elaborate inquiry into the precise harm that they caused or their business
justification. ' 38 Examples of per se violations include horizontal price-fixing
agreements, 39 vertical restraints that include "some agreement on price or
price levels," 40 horizontal agreements to divide territory, 41 and certain types
42
of tying arrangements.
Merely pleading a per se violation, however, is insufficient to sustain a
complaint. 43 The conduct in question must be examined, and the Supreme
Court has stated that the essential inquiry is "whether or not the challenged
restraint enhances competition." 44 This determination "may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies a presump'4 5
tion of anticompetitive conduct."
The unique nature of the sports industry creates problems when applying
these principles to professional sports. First, because cooperation is necessary to successful competition between the teams, the NFL more closely resembles a joint venture than a true competitive industry.4 6 In this regard,
the Supreme Court has stated that "[j]oint ventures and other cooperative
arrangements are ... not usually unlawful."'4 7 The Court cautioned, however, that "joint ventures have no immunity from the antitrust laws."'48
Second, the economic impact of free agency and other restraints on the
sports industry is uncertain. 49 This uncertainty is due in part to the limited
37. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618.
38. The Five Smiths, Inc. v. NFLPA, 788 F. Supp. 1042, 1046 (D. Minn. 1992); see, e.g.,
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Dain,
Kalman & Quail, Inc., 578 F.2d 1256, 1259 (8th Cir. 1978).
39. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 436
n.19 (1990).
40. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
42. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5-6.
43. The Five Smiths, 788 F. Supp. at 1045.
44. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104.
45. Id. at 104 n.26.
46. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619.
47. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979); see
also The Five Smiths, 788 F. Supp. at 1049 n.5 (stating that "[a] trade association is not a
walking conspiracy of its members").
48. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113.
49. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that
the NFL draft was not a per se violation, the court stated that "courts have had too little
experience with this type of restraint, and know too little of the economic and business stuff
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experience of the courts in dealing with these issues. 50 Since a court will
invoke the per se rule only when it can conclude that, "on the strength of
unambiguous experience, the challenged action is a 'naked restraint[ ] of
trade with no purpose except stifling of competition,' "51 the courts have
been unwilling to apply the per se rule to player restraints in the context of
professional sports. 5 2 Instead, the courts have turned to the Rule of Reason
in analyzing the conduct in question.
2.

Rule of Reason

The Rule of Reason has its origins in the Supreme Court's decision in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 53 in which the Court analyzed "all the
circumstances" to determine whether the conduct in question was "unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions."' 54 In order to state a Rule of
Reason claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must allege
concerted action that is intended to harm or unreasonably restrain competition and actually causes such injury to competition. 55 In determining
whether a restraint "unreasonably" restrains trade, a court should "consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint,
and its effect, actual or probable." '56 To prove the effect of the conduct, the
plaintiff must allege a relevant market 5 7 that has been adversely affected by
from which it issues, confidently to declare it illegal [as a per se violation]"); Mackey, 543 F.2d
at 618-20; see also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
50. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1182.
51. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added) (quoting Topco, 405 U.S. at 608).
52. See Richard E. Bartok, Note, NFL Free Agency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack,
1991 DUKE L.J. 503, 517 (1991) (finding that no appellate courts have applied the per se rule
to player restrictions).
53. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
54. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58.
55. Rosenbrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1138
(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982).
56. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
57. "The relevant market provides the basis on which to balance competitive harms and
benefits of the restraint at issue." Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d
1381, 1392 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); see also Kaplan v. Burroughs
Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 291 (9th Cir. 1979); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 268269 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).
In the antitrust context, the relevant market has two components: the product
market and the geographic market. Product market definition involves the process of describing those groups of producers which, because of the similarity of
their products, have the ability-actual or potential-to take significant
amounts of business away from each other. A market definition must look at all
relevant sources of supply, either actual rivals or eager potential entrants to the
market. Two related tests are used in arriving at the product market: first,
reasonable interchangeability for the same or similar uses; and second, crosselasticity of demand, an economic term describing the responsiveness of sales of
one product to price changes in another. Similar considerations determine the
relevant geographic market, which describes the "economically significant" area
of effective competition in which the relevant products are traded.
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1392-93 (quoting Kaplan, 611 F.2d at
292).
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the challenged restraint.5 8 Other relevant facts to be considered in determining the legality of the restraint include: "the history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy and the pur'59
pose or end sought to be attained.
In the context of professional football, the analysis is much the same. The
court must first "determine whether [a restraint] is significantly anticompetitive in purpose or effect." 6 Such a determination requires an examination
of the specific business involved, the history of the restraint, and the purpose(s) of the restraint. 6' If the analysis reveals legitimate, procompetitive
business purposes, the court must then weigh the "anticompetitive evils"
against the "procompetitive virtues" of the restraint. 6 2 The challenged restraint constitutes a substantial impediment to competition and is unreason63
able if the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive virtues.
The Supreme Court has, however, placed several limitations on the scope
of the Rule of Reason analysis. First, the Court noted that it is not necessary to establish a party's monopoly or market power in order to establish
the unreasonableness of a given restraint:
While the reasonableness of a particular alleged restraint often depends
on the market power of the parties involved ....

market power is only

one test of reasonableness. And where the anticompetitive effects of
conduct can be ascertained through means short of extensive market
analysis, and where no countervailing competitive virtues are evident, a
lengthy analysis of market power is not necessary. 64
Second, the Supreme Court stated that the Rule of Reason "does not open
the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason."' 65 Instead, the inquiry must
be "confined to a consideration of [the restraint's] impact on competitive
'66
conditions."
III.

HISTORY OF PLAYER RESTRAINTS
A.

THE ROZELLE RULE

In 1963, the NFL unilaterally amended its Constitution and Bylaws to
adopt the provision known as the Rozelle Rule, named after the then Commissioner of the NFL, Alvin Ray "Pete" Rozelle. The Rozelle Rule, embod58. See, e.g., Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484, 488 (8th Cir.
1985).
59. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (6 ed. 1990) (citing United States v. National Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 463 (D.D.C. 1975)).

60. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., No. Civ.A.90-1071, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2903, at *28 (D.D.C. June 22,
1992).
61. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183; Brown, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183; Brown, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183; Brown, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110-11 n.42 (quoting Brief for United
19-20, NCAA (No. 83-271)).
65. National Soc'y of ProfessionalEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688.
66. Id. at 690.

at *28.
at *28.
at *28.
States as Amicus Curiae at
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ied in section 12.1(H) of the Constitution, 67 supplemented the prior reserve
system, which bound a player to a team for only two years, allowing him to
become a free agent after fulfillment of the two-year obligation. 68 The Rozelle Rule left the reserve system in place, and specifically stated that "[a]ny
player, whose contract with a League club has expired, shall.., become a
free agent."' 69 This first sentence appeared to establish unrestricted free
agency after a player completed his option year.
The sentence that followed, however, made free agency illusory. In order
for a player to sign with a different team, the two teams had to reach a
"mutually satisfactory arrangement[ ]," or the Commissioner, in his sole discretion, could compensate the former club with an award of one or more
players from the acquiring club. 70 Because the decision of the Commissioner was final and conclusive, few teams were willing to risk an unknown
compensation if an arrangement could not be agreed upon. 7 1 Therefore,
where the two clubs were unable to work out a compensation agreement, the
effect of the Rozelle Rule was to leave the player with only two choices-re72
sign with his former club or forego playing football.

B.

MACKEY

v. NFL

In 1975, a group of NFL players attacked the Rozelle Rule by initiating a
suit against the NFL, the twenty-six member clubs, and Commissioner Rozelle. 73 The players alleged that the imposition and enforcement of the Rozelle Rule constituted an illegal combination and conspiracy in restraint of

trade denying professional football players the right to freely contract for
67. Section 12.1(H) stated:
Any player, whose contract with a League club has expired, shall thereupon
become a free agent and shall no longer be considered a member of the team of
that club following the expiration date of such contract. Whenever a player,
becoming a free agent in such manner, thereafter signed a contract with a different club in the League, then, unless mutually satisfactory arrangements have
been concluded between the two League clubs, the Commissioner may name
and then award to the former club one or more players, from ... the acquiring
club as the Commissioner in his sole discretion deems fair and equitable; any
such decision by the Commissioner shall be final and conclusive.
NFL CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 12.1 (H) (quoted in Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610-11).
68. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610. The reserve system had its basis in § 15.1 of the NFL
Constitution and Bylaws, which required that all player contracts be substantially identical to
the Standard Player Contract, and the option clause set forth in the Standard Player Contract,
which allowed a team to renew a player's contract for one year, with no right of renewal
thereafter. Id. at 610 & n.5.
69. NFL CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 12.1(H); see also Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1004,
1006.
70. Id.
71. As the Eighth Circuit noted in Mackey, from 1963 to 1974, only four players, of the
176 that played out their options during that period, signed under circumstances in which the
Commissioner awarded compensation. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611. For a detailed account of
those trades, see the district court's opinion in Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1004-05. Only 34 of
those 176 players signed with other teams, with the clubs reaching mutually agreed upon compensation in 27 of those cases. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611.
72. Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1006.
73. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), affid in part, rev'd in part, 543
F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
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their services. The district court held that the Rozelle Rule constituted a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and was therefore an illegal restraint
of trade. 74 The court based its decision primarily on the per se rule, stating
that "[tlhe Rozelle Rule and its related practices constitute a concerted refusal to deal and a group boycott on the part of defendants," making the rule
"so clearly contrary to public policy that it is per se illegal under the Sherman Act."' 75 As a secondary determination, the court analyzed the Rozelle
Rule under the Rule of Reason. After considering the restraint's anticompetitive effects and business justifications, the district court held that the justifi76
cations were insufficient to override the antitrust laws.

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit considered the antitrust issues presented
and, in affirming the district court's holding in part, established several important principles which would guide future courts in their decisions concerning the antitrust laws' application to player restraints. First, after
finding the statutory labor exemption unavailable, 77 the Eighth Circuit held
that the NFL and its member clubs, even though non-labor groups, could
avail themselves of the nonstatutory labor exemption under appropriate
78
circumstances.
Second, the court set forth the proper accommodation between the federal
labor and antitrust policies necessary to determine the applicability of the
nonstatutory labor exemption. 79 The Eighth Circuit found the proper accommodation to be:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be
given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade
primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second, federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail
only where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. Finally, the policy favoring collective
bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust
laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of
bona fide arm's-length bargaining.8 0
Applying these principles, the court summarily dismissed the first accommodation, opining that the Rozelle Rule "clear[ly]... affect[ed] only the parties
74. Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1007.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1007-08.
77. The court addressed the labor exemption issue first since, if the conduct fell within the

purview of either the statutory or nonstatutory labor exemption, an inquiry into the application of the antitrust laws would be unnecessary. The court found the statutory labor exemption inapplicable because it "does not extend to concerted action or agreements between unions
and non-labor groups." Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611; see also supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory labor exemption.
78. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 612; see also supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the nonstatutory labor exemption.
79. In considering the nonstatutory exemption, the court reiterated the Supreme Court's
holding that "in order to properly accommodate the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets with the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining[,] . ..
certain union-employer agreements must be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from
the antitrust sanctions." Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611-12.
80. Id. at 614 (citations omitted).
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'
to the agreements sought to be exempted."' 8
Turning to the second accommodation, the court relied on section 8(d) of
the National Labor Relations Act to define mandatory subjects of bargaining
as those pertaining to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."' 82 Moreover, the court found that a mandatory subject of bargaining depends on its practical effect, not its form. 83 Because the Rule had
the effect of restricting player movement and depressing player salaries, the
court concluded that the Rule pertained to the terms and conditions of8em4
ployment and therefore constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Finally, the court addressed the third accommodation of whether the Rozelle Rule was the product of arm's-length bargaining. In concluding that
the Rule was not, in fact, the product of arm's-length negotiations, the
Eighth Circuit focused on the parties' collective bargaining history. First,
the court noted that the Rule was unilaterally imposed upon the players in
1963.85 Second, the court found that in neither the 1968 nor the 1970 CBA
86
was there serious discussion of or negotiation concerning the Rozelle Rule.
Instead, the Rule was incorporated merely by reference through the Standard Player Contract, which required the players to comply with the NFL
Constitution and Bylaws, including section 12.1(H), the Rozelle Rule. 87 Finally, as institution of this suit clearly evinces, the players consistently
sought the elimination of the Rozelle Rule upon termination of the 1970
CBA in 1974.88 Because the restraint was not the product of arm's-length
negotiations, it did not qualify for the labor exemption, and was therefore
subject to the antitrust laws.
The third important principle established by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey
was that NFL player services constitute the relevant product market for antitrust analysis and that such market is subject to the antitrust laws. The
court initially faced the argument that section 6 of the Clayton Act and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of that section precluded application of the
Sherman Act to restraints on player services. Section 6 states that "[t]he
labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor."' 89 Based on this section, the Supreme Court has stated:
"[I]t would seem plain that restraints on the sale of the employee's services
to the employer, however much they curtail the competition among employees, are not in themselves combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade
or commerce under the Sherman Act." 90
Although this language appears to support defendants' argument, the

81. Id. at 615.
82. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988)).
83. Id. (citing Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968)).
84. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.

85. Id.at 616.
86. Id. at 612-13.

87. Id. at 613.
88. Id.
89. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988)).
90. Id. (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503 (1940)).
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court considered the context within which section 6 was enacted: "Section 6
... was enacted for the benefit of unions to exempt certain of their activities
from the antitrust laws after courts had applied the Sherman Act to legitimate labor activities." 9 1 Additionally, the court considered the fact that
other courts "have not hesitated to apply the Sherman Act to club owner
imposed restraints on competition for players' services."'92 The court therefore concluded that restraints on competition within the market for players'
93
services are subject to the antitrust laws.
Finally, the Eighth Circuit established that the Rozelle Rule and, more
broadly, restraints on player services are to be analyzed under the Rule of
Reason, not the per se rule. After examining the substantive legal principles
underlying the per se rule, the court held that the unique circumstances of
this case made application of the per se rule inappropriate. 94 First, the NFL
resembles "a joint venture in that each member club has a stake in the success of the other teams." 95 Because of the unique nature of the business of
professional football, the court held that a mechanical application of the per
se rule, "fashioned in a different context," was inappropriate. 96 Moreover,
one of the underlying purposes of the per se rule is judicial economy-to
"avoid[ the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved .... ,,97 Because
an "exhaustive inquiry into the operation of the NFL and the effects of and
justifications for the Rozelle Rule" had already been undertaken, judicial
economy and efficiency could not be a basis for application of the per se
rule. 9 8

Turning to the Rule of Reason, the court found that the proper inquiry
should consider not only the legitimate business purposes of the restraint,
but also whether such restraint was no more restrictive than necessary. 99
Addressing the Rozelle Rule's anticompetitive effects, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's findings that the restraint:
significantly deters clubs from negotiating with and signing free agents;
that it acts as a substantial deterrent to players playing out their options
and becoming free agents; that it significantly decreases players' bargaining power in contract negotiations; that players are thus denied the
right to sell their services in a free and open market; that as a result, the
salaries paid by each club are lower than if competitive bidding were
allowed to prevail; and that absent the Rozelle Rule, there would be
increased movement in interstate commerce of players from one club to
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618.
Id. at 619.
Id.

96. Id.
97. Id. at 619 & n.26 (quoting Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
98. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620. During 55 days of trial, 68 witnesses presented testimony,
either orally in court or solely through deposition transcript, and the parties presented over
400 exhibits. Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1002. The trial transcript extended to over 11,000
pages. Id.
99. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620.
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another. 100
Against these anticompetitive effects, the court considered the defendants'
justifications for the restraint: protection of investment, player continuity,
and competitive balance. Player development costs, such as scouting and
training expenses, constitute ordinary costs of doing business, which are
nonrecoverable.10 1 Therefore, protection of investment and the need to
recoup these costs could not justify the restraint imposed.' 0 2 In addition,
the court held that the concept of player continuity, which is based on the
need for players to work together over extended periods of time in order to
establish an effectively functioning team, was also an insufficient justification. 03 The court noted that player movement and turnover already existed
by way of trades, retirement, and the entrance of new players. 104 Moreover,
the court held that even if the quality of play declined, the justification could
not prevail over the restraint's anticompetitive effects.' 0 5
Finally, the court considered the defendants' most persuasive justification,
that unrestricted free agency would allow the most attractive teams, because
of their location, opportunities, etc., to accumulate the most talented players, thereby destroying the competitive balance necessary for the success of
the NFL.' 0 6 Although the court recognized the NFL's "strong and unique
interest in maintaining competitive balance," it found that the restraint "is
far more restrictive than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes."' 1 7 In
this respect, the court based its determination on the fact that the Rozelle
Rule applied to every player regardless of status or ability, that it was unlimited in duration, and that there were no procedural safeguards in its
enforcement. 0 8
C.

RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL/COMPENSATION

SYSTEM

As part of a class action settlement in Mackey, the NFLPA and the NFL
Management Council developed a revised system of free agency known as
the Right of First Refusal/Compensation (RFR/C) system.' 0 9 The RFR/C
system was later incorporated into the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement (1977 Agreement), which went into effect on March 1, 1977.110 Under
the revised system, an automatic one-year option clause, similar to the earlier reserve rule, was required in the contract of every rookie who signed for
only one year."' Once a player satisfied his option year or, where no option
100. Id.
101. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621.
102. Id.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 621.
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 622.
108. Id.
109. See Alexander v. NFL, No. 4-76-Civ-123, 1977 WL 1497, at **2, 4 (D. Minn. Aug. 1,

1977), affd sub nom., Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
110. Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 780.
111. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XIV, § 2 (Dec. 11, 1982) [hereinafter
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clause existed, completed his contract, he became a free agent, subject to two
important restrictions. First, the free agent's team had the option to match
any offer made to a player and retain his services.1 12 Second, even if the free
agent's team refused to match an offer, the team was still entitled to compen1 13
sation from the acquiring team in the form of future draft choices.
Although the RFR/C system was designed to eliminate the problems of
the Rozelle Rule,1 14 the actual effect of the revised system on free agency
was insignificant. During the five years in which the 1977 Agreement was in
effect, fewer than 50 of the 600 players were given offers from other NFL
teams after receiving free agent status.' 15 Moreover, fewer than twenty players actually moved teams, with most of the moves resulting from trade arrangements. 116 On only one occasion did a player transfer clubs in an
17
arrangement involving draft choice compensation.'
The 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement (1982 Agreement), which was
executed December 11, 1982, retained the Right of First Refusal/Compensation system.' 1 8 The only change in the system included an
increase in the salary levels at which draft choice compensation would be
triggered, 1 9 which adjusted player salaries for inflation.120 During the five
years in which the 1982 Agreement was in effect, the movement of players
between teams actually decreased from the five year period of the 1977
Agreement. Only one of the approximately 1400 players who became veteran free agents during the term of the 1982 Agreement received an offer
from another team, and no veteran player actually moved teams under the
12 1
Right of First Refusal/Compensation scheme.
The 1982 Agreement expired in August 1987.122 On September 22, 1987,
when negotiations failed to produce a new agreement, the members of the
NFLPA went on strike. 123 The NFLPA ended the strike twenty-four days
later on October 15, 1987, even though the parties had failed to reach a
compromise on the veteran free agency issue and even though the NFL continued to apply the provisions of the expired 1982 Agreement. 124 On that
1982 Agreement]. For rookies who signed for more than one year or for veteran players, an
option clause could be included in their contract, but was not required. Id. The 1977 Agreement expired on July 15, 1982. Powell 1, 678 F. Supp. at 780. On December 11, 1982, the
NFLPA and the NFL Management Council executed the 1982 Agreement, which retained the
RFR/C system with only minor revision. Id. at 780-81.
112. 1982 Agreement, art. XV, § 4.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. §§ 11-12.
See Alexander, 1977 WL 1497, at **20-22.
Powell I, 678 F. Supp..at 780.
Id.
Id.
1982 Agreement, art. XV, §§ 1-8.
Powell I,678 F. Supp. at 781.
Bartok, supra note 52, at 511.
Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 781 (emphasis added).
Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 711

(1991) [hereinafter Powell III].
123. Id.
124. Id.
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day, however, the NFLPA filed suit against the NFL and its member clubs
for essentially the same claims as those brought in Mackey.
D. POWELL v NFL: TERMINATION OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION
A federal district court in Minnesota had occasion to determine the scope
of the nonstatutory labor exemption in Powell v. NFL125 (Powell I) when
several professional NFL players brought suit against the NFL and its member organizations alleging violations of the Sherman Act. More specifically,
the court confronted the issues left unresolved in Mackey v. NFL: whether
the nonstatutory labor exemption extends beyond the expiration of the CBA
and, if so, when the exemption terminates.1 26 After the plaintiffs filed motions for partial summary judgment and for a preliminary injunction concerning the RFR/C system and NFL Player Contract, defendants filed a
cross-motion seekitng summary judgment on the basis that the nonstatutory
labor exemption insulated the challenged restraints from the antitrust laws.
Although recognizing that the 1982 Agreement had terminated, the court
held that basic labor law principles and the accommodation of antitrust and
labor policies required the continuation of the nonstatutory labor exemption
beyond the expiration of the agreement. 127 The Eighth Circuit, on interlocutory appeal, also concluded that the federal labor policy dictated the extension of the nonstatutory labor exemption beyond the expiration of the 1982
Agreement.1 28 Each court reached different results, however, on what test
should be applied to determine when the exemption terminates. Because of
this controversy over which standard best accommodates the policies underlying the nonstatutory labor exemption, both the district court's and the
Eighth Circuit's tests should be further examined.
1. At Impasse
After considering, and ultimately rejecting, the tests submitted by both
125. 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
126. Because the court in Mackey found the nonstatutory labor exemption inapplicable, it

never reached these issues. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616. In fact, the Eighth Circuit specifically
stated that "[i]n view of our holding, we need not decide whether the effect of an agreement
extends beyond its formal expiration date for purposes of the labor exemption." Id. at n. 18.

127. Powell 1, 678 F. Supp. at 783-86. The court relied on the "survival doctrine," which
provides for the "survival" of provisions relating to mandatory subjects of bargaining beyond
the formal expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 783-84. As a prerequisite for
the applicability of the survival doctrine, the conduct in question must have been exempt during the existence of the agreement. Id. at 783. The court found that the resolution of this issue
required an examination of the principles set forth in Mackey concerning the proper accommo-

dation between federal labor and antitrust policies. Id. at 784. Although the plaintiffs conceded that the provisions of the 1982 Agreement satisfied the first two elements of the Mackey
test, they argued that the player restraints were not the product of arm's-length bargaining.
The court concluded, however, that sufficient evidence existed which indicated the presence of
bona fide arm's-length bargaining. Id. Therefore, the nonstatutory labor exemption protected

the player restraints during the existence of the 1982 Agreement.
128. Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1300-01.
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parties, 129 the district court adopted its own test and concluded that:
[a]fter balancing the various competing interests.... proper accommodation of labor and antitrust interests requires that a labor exemption
relating to a mandatory bargaining subject survive expiration of the collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach impasse as to that
issue; thereafter, the term or condition is no longer immune from scrutiny under the antitrust laws, and the employer runs the risk that continued imposition of the condition will subject the employer to
liability. 130
In reaching its conclusion, the court determined that mandatory subjects of
bargaining must continue past expiration of the agreement.1 31 The court
based this determination on the purpose of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) 132 and other persuasive authorities that require maintenance of
the status quo in order to provide a suitable environment where negotiation
of a new collective bargaining agreement can occur. 133 Survival of the nonstatutory labor exemption not only protects and fosters this negotiating environment, but the exemption also accommodates antitrust and labor
policies.1 34 Because the need to maintain the status quo ends when a new
agreement is concluded or the parties reach impasse, the exemption also terminates. 135 To determine when impasse has been reached, "[t]he test is simply whether, following intense, good faith negotiations, the parties have
exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement."'136 The court in Powell I, however, never reached the issue of whether impasse had occurred.
Since a duty to bargain in good faith existed between the NFL owners and
players, and since the defendants had filed a charge with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) alleging that the plaintiffs had bargained in bad
faith, the court stayed its decision until the NLRB's determination of the
37
issue. '
In Powell v. NFL, 138 after the associate general counsel to the NLRB dismissed the owner's charge of bad faith bargaining, the federal district court
of Minnesota reconsidered the parties' motions.139 At a June 17, 1988 hearing on the motions, the court held that the parties had reached a bargaining
impasse over the free agency issue and that the restraints concerning that
issue were now subject to the antitrust laws. 140
129. Powelll, 678 F. Supp. at 786-88 (setting forth the standards proposed by plaintiffs and
defendants).
130. Id. at 788.
131. Id. at 784; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1988).
132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-70 (1988).
133. Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 785.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 784.

136. Id.at 788 (quoting Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 1967, NLRB Dec.
(CCH) T 21,170 (Mar. 20, 1967)).
137. Id. at 789.
138. 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1040 (1991) [hereinafter Powell II].
139. Id. at 814.

140. Id.
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Considering the utility of the impasse standard, the court in Powell II
found that its formulation for impasse promoted the collective bargaining
relationship by respecting the obligation to bargain in good faith following
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 141 Moreover, as one commentator has argued, "[i]mpasse provides a proper foundation for accommodating labor and antitrust policy in determining the scope of the labor
exemption."' 42 Finally, impasse is generally definable. The Supreme Court
defines impasse as "that point at which the parties have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement and further discussions would be fruitless." 43 Similarly, the NLRB defines impasse as "generally synonymous
with deadlock .... No impasse can occur until there appears no realistic
possibility that continuing discussions concerning the provisions at issue
would be fruitful."' 144 The NLRB has enumerated some of the considerations for determining when impasse occurs:
Whether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judgment. The bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length
of the negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to which
there is disagreement, the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations are all relevant factors to be considered in deciding whether an impasse in bargaining existed.' 4 5
Noting these considerations, along with the definitions and principles set
forth above, the impasse standard represents a workable and flexible standard to evaluate and determine if and when the labor policy no longer deserves preeminence over the antitrust laws, thereby terminating the
nonstatutory labor exemption. Arguments that the impasse standard is too
ambiguous must fail. Impasse is no more difficult to apply than the Mackey
test 146 or survival doctrine, 147 which represent an accommodation of the labor and antitrust interests underlying the nonstatutory labor exemption.
Nor is the impasse standard more difficult than the Rule of Reason, 148 which
represents an accommodation of the antitrust laws and the unique nature of
the NFL. Determinations that properly accommodate these interests, however difficult to apply, are necessary evils if the principles they further are to
be advanced. Any bright line test would constitute nothing more than an
141. Id. at 815.
142. Bradley R. Cahoon, Powell v. National Football League: Modified Impasse Standard
Determines Scope of Labor Exemption, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 381, 399 (1990); see also Powell
III, 930 F.2d at 1304-10 (Heaney, Senior J.,
Lay, C.J., McMillian, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that
the impasse standard is more consistent with the interests of antitrust and labor laws).
143. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484
U.S. 539, 543 n.5 (1988).
144. See Marriott In-Flite Serv., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 1981, NLRB Dec. (CCH) 18,550
(Sept. 30, 1981), enforced 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3528, affd 729 F.2d 1441 (2d Cir. 1983);
Marco, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 1981-82, NLRB Dec. (CCH) 18,478 (Sept. 21, 1981);
J.D. Lunsford Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 170, 1980-81,
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 17,939 (Mar. 12, 1980), aft'd sub nom., Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc., Local 9 v. NLRB, 684 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
145. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (1967).
146. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 127.
148. See supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
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arbitrary determination that, although promoting judicial efficiency and
economy, would subvert the antitrust and labor law principles.
2. The "Ongoing Collective BargainingRelationship"
On January 6, 1989, the district court certified its January 29, 1988 opinion (Powell I) for appeal to the Eighth Circuit. 149 The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that the nonstatutory labor exemption
expires upon impasse. 150 The court concluded that federal labor law, not
antitrust law, governed the action. 1 5' The court opined that the procedures
and remedies available under the labor laws sufficiently protected the parties
in the bargaining process so as to preclude application of the antitrust
52
laws.'
The court further held that the nonstatutory labor exemption applies beyond impasse.' 53 While finding that management is not forever exempt from
the antitrust laws once a collective bargaining agreement is in place, 154 the
court did not establish exactly when the exemption might terminate. The
court provided only general guidance in making such a determination. Delineating the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption, the court noted that
unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment reasonably
comprehended within pre-impasse proposals may be implemented after impasse has occurred.' 5 5 From there, the court held that agreements "conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship" are protected from
antitrust scrutiny.' 56 The Eighth Circuit therefore extended broad protection to terms either originally contained in the CBA or reasonably comprehended as extending from the original terms. 157 The court's only definitive
statement concerning when the exemption might terminate was that, "as
long as there is a possibility that proceedings may be commenced before the
[National Labor Relations] Board, or until final resolution of Board proceedings and appeals therefrom, the labor relationship continues and the labor
exemption applies."' 5 8 Under the facts of the case, however, the court found
that it was not compelled to decide when the exemption might terminate
149. Powell v. NFL, 711 F. Supp. 959 (D. Minn. 1989).
150. Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1299.
151. Id. at 1295.
152. See id. at 1300-03. As to the procedures available under the labor laws after the
expiration of the agreement, the court found that: 1) there is a continuing obligation to bargain in good faith; 2) there is an obligation to maintain current wages and working conditions
prior to impasse; and 3) once impasse is reached, employers may only impose new or different
terms that are reasonably contemplated within the scope of the pre-impasse proposals. Id. at
1300-01. Further, as to the remedies available under the labor laws, the court found that: 1)
the union can strike; 2) the employer can lock out the employees; and 3) the parties may
petition the NLRB for a cease-and-desist order prohibiting conduct constituting an unfair labor practice. Id. at 1302.
153. Id. at 1304.
154. Id. at 1303.
155. Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1302.
156. Id. at 1303.

157. Id.
158. Id. at 1303-04.
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under these principles.1 59
The standard set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Powell III creates several
problems. First, the standard provides little guidance in applying the nonstatutory labor exemption and antitrust laws to collective bargaining agreements. In concluding that the parties had "not yet reached the point in
negotiations where it would be appropriate to permit an action under the
Sherman Act,"' 6° the court implied that the parties were still engaged in an
ongoing collective bargaining relationship. This relationship existed even
though the court concluded that the parties had reached impasse and that
the players were playing under unilaterally imposed restraints. 16 1 Considering that the players went on strike over free agency 162 and that the parties
failed to reach an agreement two years after the expiration of the 1982
Agreement,1 63 it is difficult to imagine the point at which the ongoing collective bargaining relationship ends. In Powell I Judge Doty noted that "the
collective bargaining relationship between an employer and a particular
union exists for as long as that union continues to be the recognized bargaining representative of a majority of the employees."1 64 Based on this statement and the Eighth Circuit's new standard, decertification of the NFLPA
as the players' collective bargaining representative appeared to be the only
method of ensuring the termination of an "ongoing collective bargaining relationship." 165 Unfortunately, decertification is exactly the position into
166
which the NFLPA and its member players were forced.
Second, the decision in Powell III may actually discourage agreement between the parties. The court held that the parties may either bargain further, resort to economic force, or file claims with the NLRB.167 The current
history of the parties' bargaining efforts indicates that nothing will be gained
from further bargaining. 168 History also indicates that the union does not
have sufficient economic power to force the NFL to implement an unrestricted free agency system. 169 Finally, the associate general counsel to the
159. Id. at 1303.
160. Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1302.
161. See id. at 1303. After noting that unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of
employment may be made after impasse, the court found that "the challenged restraints were
imposed by the League only after they had been forwarded in negotiations and subsequently
rejected by the Players." Id. at 1302-03. Therefore, since unilateral changes may be made
only after impasse and since Plan B was implemented over the players' objection, impasse must
have been reached.
162. Id. at 1296.
163. Id. The parties went on strike in September of 1987, and this case came before the
court of appeals in November 1989. Id.
164. Powell 1, 678 F. Supp. at 788 n.18.
165. For a discussion of the detrimental effects that decertification would have on the players, see Jeffrey D. Schneider, UnsportsmanlikeConduct: The Lack of Free Agency in the NFL,
64 S.CAL. L. REV. 797, 846-49 (1991).
166. See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
167. Powell 111, 930 F.2d at 1303.
168. Since the expiration of the 1982 Agreement, the players have refused to agree to any
restriction on free agency. Lock, supra note 16, at 152-53. Additionally, NFL management
has withdrawn from and terminated both contributions to the NFL pension and the accruals
of severance pay starting in the 1989 season. Id. at 153.
169. Although the NFLPA has gained more bargaining power since the restraints imposed
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NLRB dismissed the NFL's charge of bad faith bargaining on the part of the
players,1 70 and the players did not contend that the NFL bargained in bad
faith.1 71 The NLRB also found "the question of free agency to be an issue of
such overriding importance that no agreement could be reached as long as
there was disagreement on that issue." 172 Moreover, it is unlikely that the
NLRB would consider any claims, on the basis that it is "for the courts to
decide whether the antitrust laws are being violated." 173 Therefore, under
the standard in Powell III, as long as the NFL continues to bargain in good
faith, the players will be forced to play indefinitely under the unilaterally
imposed player restraints regardless of whether the restraints violate the antitrust laws.
Finally, the dissent in Powell III argues that the court, while purporting to
apply Mackey, ignored its principles. 174 Although Mackey left open the
question of when the labor exemption expires, the court clearly implied that
the exemption should protect illegal restraints only so long as such restraints
are part of bona fide collective bargaining.' 75 This view is consistent with
176
Supreme Court decisions addressing the scope of the labor exemption.
Further, the Mackey decision was "founded on the principles that an employer's exemption owes its existence to union consent, and is aimed at preserving the integrity of the negotiating process."' 177 The majority reasons
that, after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and notwithstanding impasse, a restraint contained in a previously bargained-for agreement
retains its immunity as the product of collective bargaining. 178 Such reasoning subverts the Mackey principles by allowing the labor exemption to extend beyond impasse,179 a point already found by the Supreme Court to be a
deadlock or hiatus in negotiations. 180
As a result of its decision, the Eighth Circuit "has intervened to remove
the players' rights under the antitrust laws from the bargaining table and has
unjustifiably given the owners a continuing right to circumvent the antitrust
in Mackey, the inability of the players to force a compromise after a twenty-four day strike
indicates that the union is on less than equal footing with the NFL. See Powell I, 678 F. Supp.

at 781.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Powell I, 690 F. Supp. at 814.
Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1303.
Id. at 1304 n.2.
Id. at 1305 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1308 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (stating that "the policy favoring collective bargaining is

furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement

sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's length bargaining").
176. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
621-22 (1975) (stating that the "nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor
policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working
conditions"); Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689
(1965) (pointing out that the "exemption for union-employer agreements is very much a matter of accommodating the coverage of the Sherman Act to the policy of the labor laws").
177. Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1308 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).

178. Id. at 1302-03.
179. Id. at 1309 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
180. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982).
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laws." 181 Chief Judge Lay stated in the conclusion of his dissenting opinion
that "the union should not be compelled, short of self-destruction, to accept
illegal restraints it deems undesirable."' 182 Because the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari, 8 3 the standard established in Powell III currently
controls the issue, at least in the Eighth Circuit, and it will be the duty of the
district court to interpret the scope of that standard.
E.

PLAN B

On November 17, 1988, while Powell v. NFL was being litigated, the NFL
owners offered the players a choice of two free agency plans. 184 When negotiations over free agency failed, the owners unilaterally implemented the second proposal, known as Plan B, in February of 1989.185 Under Plan B, NFL
teams have the right to protect thirty-seven of the players on the roster at the
end of each NFL season, leaving the remaining players unprotected and unrestricted free agents.' 86 The protected players, however, are still subject to
the Right of First Refusal/Compensation system that applied in the 1977
and 1982 Agreements. 187 Moreover, since each NFL team is allowed a
forty-seven player roster, 188 only the top players are protected.
In the first season following the implementation of Plan B, 229 of the 619
unprotected and unrestricted players switched teams. 189 Additionally, the
average salary for the first 100 players who made a move increased 43.5%
from $146,500 to $259,300.190 On the other hand, not one protected player
changed teams during the same period. 19 1 Although not as broad as the
RFR/C system, Plan B still restricted a substantial number of players from
freely switching teams.
In addition to protecting thirty-seven of each team's top players, Plan B
also required all players, protected as well as unprotected, to forfeit all pension and severance benefits upon switching teams.192 Further, the accrual of
any benefits prior to the implementation of Plan B became nontransferable
to a free agent's new team.' 93 Finally, all other benefits were frozen at 1982
194
levels.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1307 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1309 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
Powell, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
See Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1303 n.10.

185. Id.
186. Craig Neff, A Semiopen Field, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 10, 1989, at 14.
187. Gordon Forbes, ControversialNew Plan Goes Into Effect Today, USA TODAY, Feb. 1,
1989, at 3C.
188. Clubs Set Standby Plan to Free Fringe Players, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1989, at B6.
189. Neff, supra note 186, at 14.
190. Id.
191. Larry Weisman, Unprotected FreeAgents Getting All The Offers, USA TODAY, Mar.
2, 1989, at 3C.
192. Manny Topol, NFL's Costly Freedom, NEWSDAY, Nov. 18, 1988, at 191.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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F.

DECERTIFICATION OF THE

1939
NFLPA

After the Eighth Circuit's decision in Powell III, the NFL players were
left with few options: "bargain further[,] .

.

.resort to economic force...

[or] present claims to the National Labor Relations Board."' 95 As noted
previously, none of these options provided adequate relief.196 With all other
avenues of recourse effectively foreclosed, the players were left with only one
choice: decertification. On November 3, 1989, the Executive Committee of
the NFLPA decided to abandon its status as the collective bargaining representative of the NFL players.' 97 On November 6, 1989, the Executive Committee notified the NFL Management Council of its decision.1 98 Then on
December 5, 1989, player representatives from the twenty-four NFL teams
unanimously voted to end the NFLPA's status as the players' collective bargaining representative.1 99 As a result, the NFLPA became a voluntary professional association.
Based upon these events, the federal district court in Minnesota held on
May 23, 1991, that the players were no longer part of an ongoing collective
bargaining relationship with the NFL.2°° The court then held that, since no
ongoing collective bargaining relationship existed, the nonstatutory labor exemption terminated. 20 ' The Powell saga had finally ended, and, based on the
termination of the labor exemption, new attacks on the NFL player restraints were beginning.
IV.

202
McNEIL v.NFL

In what would be the most important decision ever to affect professional
football, eight individual football players whose contracts expired on February 1, 1990, filed suit against the NFL and its member clubs. Plaintiffs alleged that the NFL defendants violated section 1 of the Sherman Act as a
result of illegal restraints imposed under Plan B during the 1990-1991 NFL
season. Because of the importance of the court's determinations on the motions for summary judgment, these motions will be set forth in detail below.
A.

PRETRIAL MOTIONS

1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on All Claims
Defendants moved for summary judgment contending, first, that they
functioned as a single economic entity and were therefore incapable of conspiring within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and second, that
the antitrust laws do not apply to restraints that operate solely within a labor
195. Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1303.
196. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
197. Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Minn. 1991).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1358.
201. Id. The court also decertified the class to the extent that any claims survived the court
of appeals' decision. Id.
202. 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
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market. The court held that the defendants' first argument had been expressly rejected by both the Ninth and Second Circuits. 20 3 The court further
noted that the defendants' position had been implicitly rejected in all cases
holding that various NFL player restraints violated the antitrust laws. 2° 4
Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated that "joint ventures have no
'20 5
immunity from antitrust laws."
The court also rejected defendants' second argument on the basis that the
Eighth Circuit had expressly rejected the same argument twice before 20 6 and
that "Supreme Court precedent clearly holds that the antitrust laws apply to
'20 7
restraints that operate solely within a labor market.
2. Defendants' Motion for PartialSummary Judgment on Plaintiffs'
Damages Claim
Defendants also moved for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' damage claims, arguing that, based on the court's rulings in the Powell litigation,
plaintiffs cannot recover damages under the Plan B player restraint system
for the 1990-1991 season. More specifically, the defendants asserted that
antitrust liability does not accrue until the date on which a judicial determination renders the nonstatutory labor exemption inapplicable, which would
20 9
be May 23, 1991,208 for purposes of this case.
The court recapped the relevant decisions in the Powell litigation. First,
the court recognized the Eighth Circuit's holding that the nonstatutory labor
exemption would continue to protect the player restraints as long as an
ongoing collective bargaining relationship existed between the parties. Second, the court restated its own subsequent determination that the labor exemption ended between November and December of 1989.210 The court
concluded that the significant date for determining accrual of damages was
the date of the triggering event, not the date on which the court issues its
decision.2 11 The court based its determination on Powell v. NFL, 212 which
concluded that the termination of the collective bargaining relationship does
not depend on a judicial determination "but rather on whether a majority of
203. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 879; see Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL,
726 F.2d 1381, 1388-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); North Am. Soccer League
v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
204. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 879 n.8.
205. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984).
206. See, e.g., Powell II1, 930 F.2d at 1298-99 & n.4; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616-18.
207. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 881.
208. See Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1351 (May 23, 1991, was the date on which
the court rendered its decision, stating that the labor exemption had terminated around December of 1989).
209. Defendants also argued that, based upon the decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97 (1971) (concerning the standards for retroactive application of judicial decisions),
this court's May 23, 1991, decision in McNeil should be applied only prospectively. While the
court concluded that Chevron did not preclude retroactive application of Powell v. NFL, 764
F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991), detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
comment. See McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 884-89.
210. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 883.
211. Id. at 884.
212. 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
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the employees in a bargaining unit support a particular union as their bargaining representative. '2 13 Antitrust damages, therefore, accrue from the
date on which the collective bargaining relationship ended, between Novem214
ber and December of 1989 in this case.
3.

Plaintiffs' Motion for PartialSummary Judgment Regarding
Defendants' Monopoly Power in Relevant Markets

Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the following issues:
(1) a relevant market for the services of professional football players exists in
the United States; (2) a relevant market for professional football exists in the
United States; and (3) the defendants possess monopoly power in each of
these relevant markets. Plaintiffs sought to collaterally estop 2t 5 the defendants from relitigating these issues. 21 6 Estoppel on the issue of market power
would save the plaintiffs considerable burden and expense. Although market
power is one test of "reasonableness," "[t]he reasonableness of a particular

alleged restraint often depends on the market power of the parties.

' 21 7

If the

players could not persuade the court to apply the per se rule, then they

would be forced to incur the burden and expense of the more complex Rule
of Reason analysis.
a.

218

The Existence of a Relevant Market for the Services of Professional
Football Players in the United States

Plaintiffs challenged an agreement by defendants to restrain competition
between member teams for the services of professional football players. As213. Id. (quoting Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp 1351, 1357 (D. Minn. 1991)).
214. Id.
215. The court set forth the principles of collateral estoppel:
Collateral estoppel refers to the preclusive effect given a prior determination of
fact or law in a later suit between the same parties or their privies. The doctrine
is applied to conserve judicial resources, and to avoid unnecessary expense and
the risk of inconsistent judgments. Collateral estoppel is appropriate where: 1)
The issue was identical to one raised in a prior adjudication; 2) There was final
judgment on the merits; 3) The estopped party was a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication; and 4) The estopped party was given a full and
fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue. Where, however, a party
seeks to give preclusive effect to a purely factual, as opposed to legal, determination, that party must also show that the factual determination must have been
essential to the prior judgment.
McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 890 (citations omitted).
216. Id. The plaintiffs were actually attempting to use the doctrine of collateral estoppel
offensively. The plaintiffs were not party to any previous litigation with the defendants and
were seeking to use the previous judgments against the defendants. Id. Offensive use of collateral estoppel lies within the trial court's discretion, which should consider the following three
factors when making the determination:
(1) Whether a plaintiff is being rewarded for failing to join in the prior action;
(2) Whether the defendants had an incentive to litigate the first action "fully and
vigorously"; and (3) Whether there are any procedural opportunities available
to defendants in the second action that were not available to them in the first
action of a "kind that might be likely to cause a different result."
Id. (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979)).
217. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110 n.42.
218. See Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
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serting that the relevant market 21 9 for the competitive impact of the challenged restraint was the U.S. market for services of major league professional
football players, the plaintiffs argued that defendants should be collaterally
estopped from relitigating the definition of that relevant market based on the
decisions in Mackey, 220 Kapp v. NFL, 22 1 and Smith v. Pro Football,Inc.,222
all of which decided the issue against the NFL. The court, after examining
the decisions in these cases, determined that:
the NFL defendants should be precluded from relitigating the determination that the services of major league professional football players in
the United States constitutes a relevant market for purposes of plaintiffs' claims. The court finds that all of the requirements for collateral
estoppel have been met: the issue of what constitutes a relevant market
in the present case is identical to the issue litigated in the prior cases,
the resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior decisions, there
was a final judgment on the merits against the NFL defendants in both
Mackey and Smith, defendants in the present case were also defendants
in the prior cases and defendants had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in both the Mackey and Smith cases. Based on the
foregoing, the court concludes that the NFL defendants are collaterally
estopped from relitigating the issue of the existence of a relevant market
for the services of professional league football players in the United
223
States.
b. The Existence of a Relevant Market for Professional Football in the
United States
Plaintiffs further alleged that there was a relevant market for major league
professional football in the United States that served as the source of the
NFL defendants' power to monopolize the relevant market for professional
football players' services. Plaintiffs argued that the defendants should be
collaterally estopped from relitigating the existence of that relevant market
219. "A relevant market is defined generally as 'the area of effective competition' and contains both a product element, determined by the availability and interchangeability of substitutes, and a geographic element, those areas in which the interchangeable substitutes are
traded." McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 890 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
324 (1962)); see also supra note 55.
220. 543 F.2d at 616-18, 622 (holding the Rozelle Rule to be an unreasonable restraint of
trade in violation of the Sherman Act; and further holding that the relevant market was the

market for professional football players' services).
221. 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affid in part,dismissed in part as moot, 586 F.2d
644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979) (granting plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment on various restraints implemented by the NFL defendants, including the
Rozelle Rule; also resolving the relevant market issue in holding that the Rozelle Rule restrained players' movement among the "clubs of a league that holds a virtual monopoly of
professional football employment in the United States").
222. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-87
(D.C. Cir. 1978). Applying the Rule of Reason to the college draft of football players, the
district court resolved the issue of what constitutes the relevant market, finding it to be the
"competition among the teams for the services of college players." Id.at 746. The court of
appeals held the draft to be "anticompetitive in its effect on the market for players' services,
because it virtually eliminates economic competition among buyers for the services of sellers."
593 F.2d at 1186.
223. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 892-93.
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or their monopoly power in that market based on United States Football
League v. NFL. 224 In USFL a rival professional football league and its mem-

ber teams brought suit against the NFL defendants, claiming that the defendants violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing the market
for major league professional football in the United States. After a ten-week
trial, the jury found that the NFL defendants had "willfully acquired or
maintained monopoly power in a relevant market consisting of major league
professional football in the United States."'225 The district court rejected the
NFL defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
specifically affirmed the jury's finding of the relevant market and the jury's
verdict that the NFL defendants had willfully monopolized that market. 226
The McNeil court held that application of collateral estoppel was appropriate based on the judgment in USFL. 227 In so holding, the court con-

cluded that:
the same issues of the definition and existence of a relevant market and
defendants' monopoly power in that market were raised in the USFL
case and were essential to the USFL's proof of liability under Section 2
of the Sherman Act. Defendants also fully litigated both the parameters of the relevant market and their possession of monopoly power in
that market .... [T]he jury's finding was necessary to final judgment,

final judgment was rendered against defendants on the merits
of those
issues and the decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit. 22 8
c.

The Existence of the NFL Defendants' Monopoly Power in the
Relevant Market for Services of Professional Football
Players in the United States

Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the NFL defendants had monopoly
power in the relevant market of professional football players' services in the
United States. The plaintiffs conceded, however, that this issue had never
been resolved by the courts. Since collateral estoppel requires that the issue
have been previously adjudicated, the court held that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to collateral estoppel on this issue. 2 29
224. 644 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1056-57.

227. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 893.
228. Id. (citations omitted). The defendants attempted to argue that, due to the nominal
award of damages in USFL, they had no incentive to litigate those issues. The court held,
however, that the defendants "had every incentive to litigate those issues because plaintiffs
sought over $1.7 billion dollars in treble damages." Id. at 894. The defendants also attempted
to argue that the issues determined in USFL were irrelevant. The court dismissed that argument, concluding that the existence of the defendants' monopoly power is relevant to the extent that the plaintiffs' claims are judged under the Rule of Reason. Id. at 895. The court also
found the existence of defendants' monopoly power relevant "for purposes of determining
whether the challenged restraints are more anticompetitive because they have been imposed by
a monopolist because under the Sherman Act, a monopolist is often precluded from engaging
in a practice that would be lawful in the absence of monopoly power." Id.
229. Id. at 896.
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Plaintiffs' Motion for PartialSummary Judgment Concerning
Application of the PerSe Rule to the Plan B Right of First
Refusal/Compensation System

Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the appropriate standard to be used in applying the antitrust laws. Attempting to persuade the
court to apply the per se rule to Plan B, the players argued that "'there is
now sufficient judicial experience to warrant application of the per se rule to
find [Plan B] unlawful.' "230 The court noted, however, that all of the cases
cited in support of the plaintiffs' proposition applied the Rule of Reason, not
the per se rule. 231 Additionally, the court noted that Plan B had never been
the subject of antitrust scrutiny. 232 Finally, the court concluded that it was
bound by the Mackey decision, "in which the Eighth Circuit determined that
the Rozelle Rule should be judged under the rule of reason rather than the
per se rule."' 233 Therefore, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for sum234
mary judgment on the issue of the application of the per se rule.

B.

TRIAL

The case of McNeil v. NFL went to trial on June 15, 1992. After thirty-six
days of testimony, the jury returned a verdict for the eight NFL player plaintiffs on September 10, 1992, finding that Plan B violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and awarding the plaintiffs $543,000.235 More specifically, the
jury found that the effect of Plan B was to substantially harm competition in
the relevant market for the services of professional football players. 236 Additionally, the jury also decided that although Plan B contributed to the competitive balance in the NFL, it was more restrictive than necessary to
maintain that balance. 2 37 Finally, as evidenced by the award of damages,
the jury found that the plaintiffs suffered economic injury as a direct result of
238
Plan B.
On September 21, 1992, less than two weeks after the verdict in McNeil v.
NFL, five NFL players filed a class action challenging various player rules
and restraints. 239 Because of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the NFL
and its member clubs would be estopped from denying liability for the imposition and enforcement of Plan B, thereby exposing the League to damages
230. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
at 1, 15 (quoted in McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 896).
231. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 897.
232. Id. Smith involved a challenge to the college draft, and Mackey and Kapp both challenged the Rozelle Rule. Id.
233. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 897.
234. Id.
235. McNeil v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 10,
1992); see also Don Pierson, Jury's Verdict May Transform Pro Football, CI. TRIB., Sept. 11,
1992, at IC.
236. McNeil, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (answer to question of fact number one).
237. Id. (answer to questions of fact numbers two and three).
238. Id. (answer to questions of fact numbers four and five).
239. See White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn. 1993).

NFL FREE AGENCY

1994]

1945

in the neighborhood of $211 million. 24 0 With arguments on White set to
begin November 12, 1992, and realizing the potential consequences of that
case, the NFL and the players began negotiating a settlement agreement and
a new collective bargaining agreement. On January 6, 1993, the NFL and its
players reached a tentative agreement to settle their dispute and agreed to a
new seven-year contract, ending a remarkable five-year period since the expiration of the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement in 1987.241
V.

THE 1993 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
A.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

Before becoming the official 1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement (1993
Agreement), the NFLPA had to be recertified as the players' collective bargaining representative. 242 On March 23, 1993, Richard A. Berthelsen, General Counsel of the NFLPA, sent a letter to Commissioner Paul Tagliabue
informing him that " '[a] majority of the players on 1992 season-ending rosters have now signed cards authorizing the NFLPA to represent them for
the purposes of collective bargaining.' ",243 On April 30, 1993, the District
Court of Minnesota concluded that the NFLPA once again represented the
244
players as their exclusive collective bargaining representative.
On May 6, 1993, the NFLPA and the NFL reached an agreement on the
terms of a new CBA and on the terms of a Stipulation and Settlement Agreement concerning the outstanding cases. 245 The terms of the Stipulation and
Settlement Agreement concerning free agency were incorporated into the
1993 Agreement, 246 which went into effect on March 31, 1993.
The 1993 Agreement will cover seven seasons, from 1993 to 1999,247 and
allow veteran players, those players with five years of experience, unrestricted free agency for the first time in the history of professional football. 248 Once a player becomes a free agent, he will have four and a half
months, from March 1 to July 15, to negotiate with other teams. 249 Some
240. See Lester Munson, The Shape of Things to Come, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 29,
1992, at 76; Lester Munson, Plan B, as in Bogus, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 21, 1992, at 7.
241. Gerald Eskenazi, N.FL. Labor Accord Is Reached Allowing Free Agency For Players,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at Al; see also White v. NFL, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993).
242. White, 836 F. Supp. 1465, 1498 (D. Minn. 1993).
243. See White, 822 F. Supp. at 1435. The American Arbitration Association reported on
March 26, 1993, that 873 cards, sufficient to establish a majority standing of the NFLPA, had
been executed and returned. Id.
244. Id.
245. See White, 836 F. Supp. at 1465-66.
246. See White, 822 F. Supp. at 1412-13; White, 836 F. Supp. at 1498 (amending various

terms of the Stipulation Settlement Agreement). See also NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 1993-2000 arts. XIX, XX [1993 Agreement].
247. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 1993-2000 art. LVIII.
248. 1993 Agreement art. XIX § l(a). The closest the NFL players came to unrestricted
free agency was the reserve system and the decision in Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (holding the Rozelle Rule in violation of the antitrust laws). The players bargained both of these away, however, exchanging the reserve system
for the Rozelle Rule and the Rozelle Rule for the Right of First Refusal/Compensation System. See supra text accompanying notes 67-124.
249. 1993 Agreement art. XIX § l(b).
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exclusions and exceptions in the new free-agency system still exist, but they
are few, and come at the price of the owners, rather than the players.
In the first year of the agreement, each NFL team was allowed to exclude
one player from the free-agent pool, considered the "Franchise Player," and
have the right of first refusal on two other players. 250 The Franchise Player

must be offered a contract with compensation that equals or exceeds the
average salary of the top five highest paid players at his position or 120% of
his prior year salary, whichever is greater. 251 Similarly, the Transition Players must be offered contracts with compensation that equals or exceeds the
average salaries of the top ten highest paid players at that position or 120%

of their prior year's salary, whichever is greater. 252 In the second year,
teams will be permitted to exclude a Franchise Player and one Transition
Player.253 Except in 1999, when each club will be permitted to designate one
Transition Player in addition to the Franchise Player, each
team will be lim254
ited to only the Franchise Player after the second year.
In addition to free agency, the players will receive, in the form of salaries
and benefits, a greater percentage of designated league gross revenue. 255
Designated league gross revenue includes local, national, and international
television revenues and gate receipts. 256 Due to the contractual nature of
television revenues and the relatively stable gate receipts, these amounts
should remain generally fixed for the foreseeable future. 257 The designated

gross league revenue does not include merchandise sales, stadium luxury
suites or stadium concession sales. 258 The percentage will increase from the
current fifty-seven percent 259 to a maximum of sixty-seven percent of designated league gross revenues. 260 Once player salaries and benefits reach sixtyseven percent, a salary cap will be imposed on each team, reducing the players' percentage of league gross revenue to a maximum sixty-four percent the
next year, then sixty-three percent the next year, and finally sixty-two per250. Id. art. XX § 1, 3. The Right of First Refusal/Compensation (RFR/C) here is similar in operation to that under the previous Right of First Refusal/Compensation System. See
supra text accompanying notes 17-31. There are, however, two important differences. First,
the new RFR/C system applies only to "Restricted Free Agents," those veteran players who
have played at least three, but less than five years, and "Transition Players," those players
permitted to be designated under section 3 of Article XX. 1993 Agreement arts. XIX § 2, XX
§ 3(b). Second, the Qualifying Offer amounts, which represent the minimum dollar amounts
that must be tendered in order to invoke the RFR/C system, have been substantially raised.
See id. art. XIX § 2(b). Therefore, it is entirely feasible that a Restricted Free Agent could
sign with another team without ever invoking the RFR/C system.
251. 1993 Agreement art. XX § 2(c).
252. Id. art. XX § 4(a).
253. Id. art. XX § 3(a).
254. Id.
255. Eskenazi, supra note 241, at B1. Designated league gross revenues amount to approximately 95% of the league's gross revenues.
256. Toni Grossi, NFL Owners Find Labor Peace Isn't that Costly After All, PLAIN
DEALER,

Feb. 15, 1993, at 3E.

257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Tim Cowlishaw, A Look at NFL Free Agency, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 7,
1993, at 28B.
260. Eskenazi, supra note 241, at B7.
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cent for each year thereafter. 261 The salary cap, however, is only effective
from 1994 to 1998.262 The cap was delayed "to allow the league and its
teams to become comfortable with the concept of free agency and because
the contract specifies that the cap does not come into play until salaries and
benefits leaguewide reach sixty-seven percent of the N.F.L.'s gross revenues."' 263 Also, for each year in which a salary cap is effective, the players

must receive a minimum of fifty-eight percent of designated revenues. 2 64 In
return for the salary cap, the players will receive free agency after only four
26 5
years.
The agreement will also include a provision known as the Rooney Rule,
which will generally prevent the four teams that participated in the NFC.
and AFC Championship games from entering the free-agent market. 26 6 An
exception exists where one of the teams loses a player through free agency,
in which case the team can sign a player with up to, but not more than, an
equivalent compensation. 267 The rule also affects the next four playoff
teams. Those teams can sign only one free agent over $1,500,000 but may
sign an unlimited number of free agents under $1,000,000.268 Additionally,
those teams will be allowed to replace lost free agents in the same manner as
the top four clubs. 269 The restrictions on the top eight teams are not permanent, however, and apply only in years where no salary cap exists. 270 Unfor27 1
tunately, it is uncertain when the cap will go into effect.
Finally the agreement includes provisions regarding litigation settlement,
application of the antitrust laws, and the expiration of the agreement. The
owners will pay approximately $195 million to settle all outstanding litigation against the NFL concerning free agency. 272 Additionally, to protect
themselves against the uncertainty of the nonstatutory labor exemption, the
parties specifically agreed that "the labor exemption from the antitrust laws
applies during the express term of this Agreement and to any conduct of the
NFL and the NFLPA taken in accordance with the terms of this Agreement
during its express term. '273 Moreover, the NFL players agreed not to commence an action under the antitrust laws following expiration of the Agreement, until either: "(i) the Management Council and NFLPA have
bargained to impasse; or (ii) six months after such expiration, whichever is
later ....-"274 In return for this assurance from the players, the NFL and its
member clubs agreed to waive any right to assert the labor exemption de261. Id.
262. Id.

263. Id.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
Eskenazi, supra note 241, at B7.
Cowlishaw, supra note 259, at 28B.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cowlishaw, supra note 259, at 28B.
Eskenazi, supra note 241, at B7.
1993 Agreement art. LVII § 2.
Id. art. LVII § 3(a).
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fense "based upon any claim that the termination by the NFLPA of its status as a collective bargaining representative is or would be a sham, pretext,
ineffective, requires additional steps, or has not in fact occurred. ' 275
B.

EFFECTS OF THE AGREEMENT

The NFL has been arguing since Mackey v. NFL that free agency would
destroy the League by disrupting the competitive balance necessary to the
presentation of a successful entertainment product. 2 7 6 More recently, NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue stated that free agency would create "doormat" teams, leading to "blowout games" and the destruction of the NFL's
competitive balance. 277 The feared consequences of free agency never, of
course, materialized. These arguments were nothing more than facades to
the underlying reasons for free agency: retention of quality players and suppression of player salaries.
Under the new 1993 Agreement, approximately 120 players changed
teams during the four-and-a-half-month free agency period in 1993.278 Additionally, these players enjoyed average pay hikes of more than 125%.279
The large-market argument, that the best players would transfer to the largest cities, also failed to materialize. For example, defensive end Reggie
White left Philadelphia, the nation's fifth-largest city, for Green Bay, the
NFL's smallest city. 280 Linebacker Hardy Nickerson, after receiving offers
from twenty teams, left the Pittsburgh Steelers for the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. 281 The Atlanta Falcons, the League's worst defensive team in 1992,
signed Pro Bowl defensive end Pierce Holt, who turned down a larger offer
from the New York Jets. 282 The Indianapolis Colts signed the League's best
available tackle, Will Wolford, and center, Kirk Lowdermilk. 283 These are
284
just a few of the examples.
All that glitters is not gold, however. Several new restrictions have been
implemented. The most important is the salary cap, which limits the
amount expended on player salaries to sixty-seven percent of the teams' collective revenue. 285 Moreover, when expenditures reach sixty-seven percent,
the percentage allowed to be expended the following years falls to sixty-four
percent. Assuming that each team grosses approximately $45 million, the
salary cap per team will be around $30 million. 286 As player salaries rise in
the new competitive market for player services, staying under this cap may
275. Id. art. LVII § 3(b).
276. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611; McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 897.
277. Jerry Kirshenbaum, Ah, Freedom, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 14, 1992, at 10.
278. Peter King, The League of the Free, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 26, 1993, at 32.
279. Danny Sheidan, Playboy's Pro FootballForecast, PLAYBOY, Oct. 1993, at 108.
280. King, supra note 278, at 32.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. For a detailed report of who went where, see King, supra note 278, at 32-35. See also
Sheidan, supra note 279, at 108-18.
285. Sheidan, supra note 273, at 108.
286. See id. at 108.
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prove difficult. For example, the Washington Redskins spent $31.7 million
on salaries last season, and nineteen of its players alone made $20.2 million.
In addition to having the second highest paid running back in the League,
Emmitt Smith at $13.6 million, the Dallas Cowboys just resigned Troy Aikman for the largest contract in NFL history-$50 million over eight
years. 2 8 7 It has been argued that, with salaries soaring and a cap on the
288
amount that can be spent on those salaries, a caste system will develop.
Considering the recent advances in the salaries of the most talented players,
such a system is certainly plausible, and even likely.
Other restrictions of the new 1993 Agreement are the Franchise and Transition Player(s). As discussed previously, every team is allowed to designate
one Franchise Player each year of the Agreement. Additionally, two Transition Players are allowed to be designated by each team in 1993, one in 1994,
and one in 1999. Considering the history of player restraints, the players
have come a long way regarding the number of players who may be unconditionally restricted: from every player in the NFL under the Rozelle Rule to
no more than three players on each team under the 1993 Agreement.
Although not as comforting to the Franchise or Transition Player(s), the
1993 Agreement fairly accommodates the League's argument for competitive balance and the players' interests in freedom of movement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The fight over free agency is, for the moment, at an end. The parties have
specifically agreed that the nonstatutory labor exemption shall apply for the
term of the 1993 Agreement to any conduct taken in accordance with the
terms of the Agreement. Therefore, as long as the conduct is within the
terms of the agreement, the antitrust laws will be inapplicable until the
Agreement expires. This will eliminate the issue in Mackey v. NFL. Moreover, after the expiration of the Agreement, no player may commence suit
against the NFL under the antitrust laws for at least six months. Even after
six months, the parties must still determine if they have bargained to an
impasse. If they have, the players may file suit against the NFL.
After suit has been filed, the players will be faced with the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Powell v. NFL, which held that the labor exemption applies as
long as a continuing collective bargaining relationship exists. Faced with
this standard, the players would again have to decertify the NFLPA as their
exclusive collective bargaining representative to terminate the labor exemption. In the meantime, however, the NFL will have unilaterally implemented its own terms once the impasse was reached. The possibility exists,
however, that with two strong dissents 289 and the adoption by other courts
287. Frank Litsky, Aikman on Receiving End of$50 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,1993, at

B9.
288. See Sheidan, supra note 273, at 108.
289. Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1304-10 (Heaney, Senior J., Lay, C.J., McMillian, 3.,
dissenting).
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of standards closer to impasse, 290 the Eighth Circuit may reconsider its decision in Powell.
Once the labor exemption terminates, the court must analyze the conduct
under the antitrust laws. In this respect, the court, guided by the Rule of
Reason, must first determine whether the restraint is significantly anticompetitive based on an analysis of the industry involved, the history of the restraint, and the justifications for the restraint. The players will be able to
collaterally estop the defendants from arguing the issue of the relevant market for player services and for professional football.
If legitimate business reasons exist for the restraint, the court must then
weigh the anticompetitive effects against the procompetitive justifications.
The court must also consider whether the restraint is no more restrictive
than necessary. If the court is faced with the restraint on Franchise or Transition Players, the justifications for the restraint-competitive balance and
quality of play-may be sufficient to outweigh the restraint's anticompetitive
effects. Because of this, courts have recognized the unique nature of the
NFL as a joint venture, and have noted that some restrictions may be necessary to the success of the NFL. Depending upon the future of the restraints
in the 1993 Agreement, such restraints, if attacked, may be the first in NFL
History to survive antitrust scrutiny. Hopefully, the 1993 Agreement will
perform to the satisfaction of both parties, thereby obviating the need for
another showdown in the courtroom. Regardless of the outcome, however,
one thing is certain-professional football will survive.

290. See Brown v. Pro Football, 1993 WL 522950 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1991); Powell , 678 F.
Supp. at 784-85; Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 966.

